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1 Introduction
A new style of durable good consumption through a large-scale online redistribution marketplace, char-
acterized by a relatively small degree of usage and a short-term ownership compared to a traditional one,
is becoming increasingly popular these days. In such a consumption style, new durable goods buyers
have solid plans to resale these goods after a short period to buyers.
Traditionally, resale market disfunctionalities, such as asymmetric information that creates the market-
extinguishing lemon problem, hindered the opportunities of a durable goods consumption with temporary
ownership. Now, with the emergence of secured, reputable, and convenient online websites that mitigate
resale market disfunctionalities, online market places such as eBay and Yahoo! Auction enable us to
pursue more and more temporal consumption of durable goods. As a consequence, it is now common
to see an individual seller (including a non-professional) on eBay who auctions off a textbook after an
academic semester, current year models of PRADA shoes and clothes after a few times of usage, a func-
tional (yet expensive) childseat or stroller for an infant after a certain stage of development, a carpentry
tool (e.g. power drill) after light use, video game software a few months after purchase, or any other
high-tech gadgets (e.g. smart phones and tablets) after a short but specific period usage such as until
the appearance of a next generation model. Moreover, author of the the business book “Futureshop”
predicts the future of the durable goods markets as follows:
“This [online-market-based temporary ownership] shift will redefine socially accepted norms of consumer
buying and selling behavior. We will soon live in a world where the norm is to sell our iPods after using
them a year. Or to sell our $800 Jimmy Choo shoes after wearing them twice...”1
However, while the volume of such brief and resale-aiming purchases is increasing with unprecedented
numbers of online durable goods sellers and buyers, the structure of such fast turn-around markets has
not yet been much investigated. As a result, we thus far have limited understanding of the market
structure and individual-level welfare nature of this newly emerging durable consumption style, such as
welfare damage caused by resale transaction costs.
1See Nissanoff (2006) for details.
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This short article contributes to the empirical durable goods literature by modeling quickly-circulating
resale markets with planned temporary ownership and resale-aimed-purchasing buyers. It also theoret-
ically and empirically assesses the individual-level welfare loss caused by resale-market friction costs.
Although the markets for temporal ownership are rapidly growing and expected to expand further and
faster in the future, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical research has been reported on welfare loss
in such quickly-circulating durable goods markets.
For the sake of empirically deriving individual-level welfare implications, we use a unique dataset from a
durable goods market in which perfectly-substitutable goods are traded with high volume. Specifically,
the durable goods we analyze here are multi-use train tickets which are indivisible yet partially usable
and resalable. Notably, as the buyers (train travelers) who purchase these tickets do so purely for the
purpose of train riding, market participants treat new and used goods equally based on their demand
and degree of usage.
Particularly, this resale market has the following advantages for empirical and structural analysis. First,
there is a monopoly new durable good seller that sells new durable goods with a fixed price. Second, the
durable goods are reasonably considered perfectly substitutable across any vintage, especially between
new and resold durable goods, which in turn enable us to construct indifference conditions and estimate
the closed-form solutions of resale market prices. Third, the degree of depreciation is objectively mea-
sured and clearly categorized by the recorded usage. Fourth, as the characteristic of durable goods is
publicly well-known, there is little concern of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in a
resale market. Fifth, except the channel of monetary gain from resale, there does not exist the method
of dynamic utility transfer, a factor that largely simplifies our empirical model. Sixth and most im-
portantly, although this product is a specific good, it actually shares many common characteristics of
general durable and resalable goods. Thus, we are able to derive profound insights on costs and welfare
structures for other commonly-traded durable good markets.
1.1 Research Method
Our research methods are twofold. First, for the structural model analysis, we construct our model based
on the assumption that a durable goods user knows her demand (how many degrees of depreciation she
3
wants to consume) for modeling the essence of the recent trend of online durable goods trades (i.e. buying
with planned temporary ownership). Also, by following the precedented literature, we use competitive
price-taking rational expectation equilibria with no arbitrage condition in both primary new good and
secondary resale good markets. We choose the price-taking assumption as there are numerous buyers and
sellers observed (and recorded in the dataset) in our empirically-analyzed markets. In addition, anecdotal
evidence supports that each market participant hardly has market power, and any arbitrage opportunities
are immediately exploited by them. With the nature of perfect substitutability and the simplification of a
committed search process in resale markets (in other words, once a potential buyer decides to buy a used
good rather than new, she commits to hear search of used goods), the no arbitrage condition enables us
to construct an indifference condition system from which analytic solutions of competitive resale market
prices are derived. In addition, insightful analytic solutions for resale market prices and individual-level
welfare loss among durable goods users are obtained. Such discerning observations clarify the direction
of resale-market price distortions and the heterogeneous effects of individual-level welfare loss caused by
resale market friction costs.
Second, for the empirical analysis, following the precedent of the empirical search model estimation
method set by the seminal work of Hong and Shum (2006), we primarily use price data for our main
estimation framework. Specifically, we estimate the closed-form solutions of competitive resale market
prices with observed prices. Furthermore, we apply the rational expectation equilibrium framework, in
which market participants have expectations on resale prices that agree with empirically observed prices,
for applying Generalized Method of Moments (henceforth GMM) estimations. Our structural estimation
results show that resale market friction costs are large (around $10 U.S. Dollars, approximately 8% of the
new good price) and individual-level welfare losses are substantially heterogeneous and different across
the types of durable goods users. We also consider these individual-level welfare losses to be “hidden
charges” among durable goods market participants. Consequently, some users are excluded from markets
as they cannot afford such hidden charges.
1.2 Literature Review
This research is related to the empirical and structural durable goods literature in which, despite the
high real-world importance and practicality, only several structural estimations have been reported.
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Suslow (1986) structurally investigated and estimated the classical case of Alcoa’s aluminum primary
and secondary (aluminum scrap) markets. Porter and Sattler (1999) propose a model of imperfectly
substitutable durable goods and conduct the reduced-form investigations of U.S. automobile markets for
testing their model predictions. Stolyarov (2002) proposes a durable goods market model that allows
multi-period goods holding and calibrated the model to match U.S. autobmobile markets. Chevalier
and Goolsbee (2005) study academic textbook markets and support that buyers (i.e. college students)
are forward looking and expect durable goods renewals (i.e. textbook edition changes). The seminal
structural-estimation work of Esteban and Shum (2007) enable the literature move forward by inventing
an empirical dynamic model of oligopolistic primary and competitive secondary car markets with con-
sumer heterogeneities by simplifying there is no resale market search and transaction costs. Chen et al.
(2013) extend the framework of Esteban and Shum (2007) through calibration analyses and numerically
investigate the welfare consequence of secondary market openings with transaction costs. Ishihara and
Ching (2012) investigate the durable goods markets for non-depreciating goods (i.e. digital products)
with Bayesian approaches. Gavazza et al. (2014) construct the model of heterogenous durable goods
buyers and report the calibration result to match the data from the U.S. automobile market. Most
recently, Leslie and Sorensen (2014) construct a structural model of concert ticket markets with limited
supply quantities due to concert venue capacity constraints. In their model, concert goers and scalpers
(who have rent-seeking motives) have to incur costly lining-up time (in a primary concert-ticket market)
and resale market transaction costs.
The main conclusion from the literature is simple: durable goods market outcomes, such as welfare
improvements and deterioration, ultimately depend on the magnitude of resale market friction costs.2
This research extends these preceding works by focusing on temporal ownership trades with frequent
turn-around in a large online platform. Notably, our research investigates primary and secondary market
interactions without supply quantity restrictions so that we separately estimate both buyer-side search
and seller-side resale costs. Given the rapid increases in online durable goods trades with resale-aimed
purchases, we extend the literature as it is now more important than ever to understand the structure of
such newly developing markets based on structurally estimated friction costs.
2In their influential calibration-based research, Chen et al. (2013) denoted that “In our analysis, transaction costs play a key
role by letting us to assess the effects.”
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1.3 Limitations
Before proceeding, we end this introduction section by stating the limitations of this short article. We
recognize that one of the ultimate purposes of empirical durable goods market research is aimed at an
entire industry-level welfare analysis. Rather than looking at such an industry-level welfare structures,
we here focus on the resale market structure and individual-level welfare loss analyses. For this reason, we
simplify our analyses by fixing tge new good price.3 Although our research focuses not on industry-level
welfare but on individual-level welfare loss, the obtained analytic welfare-loss functions have straight-
forward interpretations. Accordingly, derived market properties in this article will provide clear insights
for further research development. Such development includes calibration-based analyses in durable goods
markets with resale opportunities, especially regarding temporary ownership markets that are rapidly
growing with large redistribution systems (e.g. eBay and Yahoo! Auctions). In the conclusion section,
we will provide the discussions of generalizability and applicability of our results to general durable goods
markets.
1.4 Paper Organization
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the durable goods markets from which
we obtained our dataset and where perfectly substitutable goods are traded; Section 3 first illustrates a
simple model of durable good users then reports several key observations, including welfare loss structures;
Section 4 reports the estimation results and heterogenous welfare loss among durable goods users; lastly,
Section 5 concludes with potential extensions.
2 Market Background and Data Description
This section describes our empirically analyzing durable goods, train coupon tickets, that are commonly
traded in Japan. The primary market for these goods is monopolized by a national-wide semi-privatized
railway operator that sets a fixed price for new goods, while decentralized secondary (used goods) markets
are highly synchronized with each other due to the commoditized nature of ticket coupons. Although
we have limited data extracted from an online auction platform, this specific market environment is still
suitable for empirical and structural research.
3In our empirically analyzing dataset, the monopolist kept having a fixed new good price.
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2.1 Durable Goods Sold by a Monopolist
We use the online transaction data of coupon tickets, called “Seishun-18-Kippu,”4 issued by Japan Rail-
ways, the succeeding body (after the deregulation and semi-privatization) of the former national railway
in Japan. This coupon ticket enables holders to have unlimited rides (within a day) throughout nation-
wide rail-transportation routes operated by Japan Railways, illustrated in Figure 1, yet it allows users to
ride only slow/stopping train services (and users cannot ride express, overnight sleeper, or bullet trains).
The coupon tickets are issued and used each year for limited periods, including the summer break pe-
riod (from July 20th to August 31st), and we are emprically analyzing the data extracted from summer
2013 for this research.5 According to Japan Railways, approximately 670,000 coupon tickets were issued
throughout the calendar year of 20136 (including all spring, summer, and winter breaks), and the amount
of (new goods) sales is approximately 77 million dollars.
The characteristics of this coupon ticket are unique, yet the coupon has many commonalities with other
general durable goods. First, as shown in Figure 2, Japan Railways bundles a set of five rides7 and sells
the bundled coupon ticket at $115 (or 11,500 yen = e 95 =£75)8, and Japan Railways neither allows
nor sells any other denominations of this coupon. Thus, there is no unbundled Seishun-18-Kippu coupon
traded in either primary and resale markets. However, as similar to other general durable goods, it can
be partially used. Therefore, the good is indivisible yet partially usable. The pictures of such partially
used coupon tickets are listed in Figure 2 (b) to (e). We categorize such partially used tickets as Vintage
IV, III, II, and I according to their remaining usages. For instance, the Vintage III ticket is still valid for
three all-day rides. We also refer to the new ticket (listed in Figure 2 (a)) as a new or Vintage V ticket.
Note that as Japan Railways is the only seller of the new tickets, it is considered to be a monopolistic
4The direct translation of “Seishun” is “youth” and “Kippu” is “ticket,” yet the literal meaning here is a ticket for college-
aged (approximately age 18 ) students. There is, however, no age restriction on purchasing this ticket and a student card is not
required. See http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/pass/seishun18.html for the details of this coupon.
5Other periods for which Seishun-18-Kippu coupon tickets are issued and used are the spring break period (from March 1st
to March 31st) and winter break period (December 10th to December 31st). We choose the summer period for our empirical
investigation as it has the longest issuing (and resale trading) duration and is most suitable for durable goods research with
resale opportunities. As the name of Seishun-18-Kippu indicates, Japan Railways designed to sell these coupon tickets for selling
to students who have sufficient time to afford slow/stopping train travels during their school break periods.
6Data Source: Asahi-Shinbun newspaper, 2014 July 26th Evening Edition
7Throughout this research, we use the term “ride” to refer to one all-day (and within-day-unlimited) use of the ticket. So, a
ticket with two remaining rides means it is still valid for two all-day uses.
8Throughout this research, we use the U.S. dollar notations with the fixed exchange rate of 1 U.S. dollar = 100 Japanese yen
(= 0.826 Euro = 0.652 British Pound)for the simplicity of discussion.
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seller9 of new (or Vintage V) tickets. Also, Japan Railways does not engage in any means of resale
business.
Regarding the time framework of this empirical research, we restrict our analyses to summer breaks,
and a time period index t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T} is defined as follows. At the beginning of a summer break
season, Japan Railways begins to provide Seishun-18-Kippu related services. We set two days after such
a service starting date10 as t = 0 and chronologically define time periods (i.e. a day) based on dates.
On the other hand, at the end of a summer, Japan Railways stops selling new tickets. We set one week
before such a sell-stoppage date11 as time T . Based on this time period framework, we have T = 32 in
our empirical analyses.
2.2 Secondary Markets
Due to their partial-usability nature, the used Seishun-18-Kippu coupon tickets are widely traded in sec-
ondary markets in Japan, such as a large-size online auction site and second-hand ticket scalping shops.
Among them, “Yahoo! Auction” is the most well-known trading place, and we focus on the data from this
online auction market.12 In fact, the number of partially-used Seishun-18-Kippu coupon tickets traded on
the Yahoo! Auction site per day by far exceeds an average of one hundred during a summer break season.
Specifically, in summer 2013, about 8,000 Seishun-18-Kippu coupon tickets were transacted on Yahoo!
Auction. Accordingly, in our structural model, we exploit the large-size nature of this online trading place.
Regarding resale market prices, averaged daily transacted prices for each vintage category in summer
9The primary and secondary markets of Seishun-18-Kippu are reasonably considered to be separated from other travel service
markets in Japan for the following reasons. First, due to its (cheap but) time-consuming nature, Seishun-18-Kippu is different
from other types of train services (i.e. rapid express, overnight sleeper, and bullet trains) offered by Japan Railways. In fact,
the coupon is well-known among young people as an extremely cheap (yet extremely time-consuming) mean of transportation
during break seasons. Second, all other private railways in Japan are localized and regionally operate. Thus, given the nature of
nation-wide usability, the coupon is reasonably considered to have negligibly low substitutability with other train tickets offered
by other private railways as buyers of the Seishun-18-Kippu tickets are different from buyers of tickets issued by regional railways.
Lastly, due to the slow/stopping train service nature, it is more time-consuming to travel with Seishun-18-Kippu compared to
bus travel. In fact, bus traveling is a relatively more expensive mean of transportation in Japan due to high expressway toll
charges and, for the reason of daytime congestion, attracts overnight travelers (which would require to consume two all-day rides
of a Seishun-18-Kippu coupon ticket and thus would not be attractive to those coupon holders).
10We exclude the first two days for securing a high volume of used tickets sold on Yahoo! Auction.
11We exclude the last seven days in order to define expected resale prices based on rational expectations. Detailed explanations
are provided in the estimation section.
12Yahoo! Auction is the dominant online-auction site in Japan, and its share of online trades was 76 percent as of June 2014.
Note that eBay, the dominant online auction platform in North America, Europe, and Australia, was introduced in Japan in
1999, yet it exited in 2002 due to the low number of users.
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2013 are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. The solid (and perfectly horizontal) lines are added for depicting
the fixed new (Vintage V) price of $115 that is set by Japan Railways. In Figure 3, we observe that
within-a-day-averaged transacted prices of Vintage IV and III tickets are slightly and gradually decreas-
ing over the sampled period, while those of Vintage II and I tickets are relatively flatter. Figure 4 reports
the percentage of the new goods price (i.e. $115 is equal to 100%). We also add the horizontal lines of
80%, 60%, 40%, and 20% of the new goods prices, called theoretical percentages (or theoretical prices),
that have theoretical foundations to be explained in the modeling section. Interestingly, we discover that
observed within-a-day-averaged prices are both above and below theoretical percentages, a phenomena
that will be structurally explained by our structural model.
Lastly, it should be noted that Yahoo! Auction is not the only place where train travelers trade their
durable coupon tickets, and we only observe a portion of resale transactions regarding Seishin-18-Kippu
during the summer of 2013. In fact, out of the 670,000 new (Vintage V) coupon tickets issued by Japan
Railways in the calendar year of 2013, we only observe approximately 8,000 resale transaction records
collected from Yahoo! Auction during the summer of 2013. Moreover, over-the-counter scalping shops for
tickets are legally allowed and quite popular in Japan, and there are a couple of chain stores that engage
in such ticket scalping business. Thus, our dataset is limited and missing resale market transaction data
that happened outside of Yahoo! Auction.
These difficulties notwithstanding we construct our structural model based on the observed and averaged
price data collected from Yahoo! Auction. The economic logic that justifies the usage of such limited
resale market data (and non-usage of other resale market transactions) is that the Seishun-18-Kippu tick-
ets are highly commodified and easily resalable with publicly-known characteristics and little asymmetric
information. Thanks to many online forums disseminating price information (both buying and selling
prices) and the fact that scalping shops post Seishun-18-Kippu daily buying and selling prices on their
websites, resale market prices are common knowledge and known to be synchronized. Thus, there is no
difficulty in finding trading opportunities to resell in various (both online and over-the-counter) resale
markets. As a result, although our dataset is limited, the recorded prices in our dataset are generated
from resale markets that are closely linked and synchronized with other resale markets. In fact, discus-
sions on online forums indicate that any price gap in resale markets is immediately exploited by market
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participants, including scalping shop managers. Thus, the observed prices in our dataset intrinsically
contain the price information of other resale markets. We will provide detailed explanations regarding
this point in the modeling section of this research.
Figure 1: Available Nation-Wide Railroads Valid for a Seishun-18-Kippu Train Ticket
Figure 2: Seishun-18-Kippu
(a) Vintage V (New) Ticket:
Valid for Five Train Rides,
sold at $115 (the fixed new
good price)
(b) Vintage IV (Slightly
Used/ Used Once Already)
Ticket
(c) Vintage III (Moderately
Used / Used Twice Already)
Ticket
(d) Vintage II (Slightly Heav-
ily Used / Used Three Times
Already) Ticket
(e) Vintage I (Heavily Used
/ Used Four Times Already)
Ticket
(f) Invalid (Used Five Times
Already) Ticket: No Longer
Valid
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Figure 3: Observed Nominal Prices
Figure 4: Observed vs. Theoretical Prices: Per-
centages
3 A Model of Resale Goods Markets and Welfare Impli-
cations
In this section, we first describe an empirical model of resale markets with perfectly substitutable durable
goods. Then, we illustrate the key assumptions and their economic interpretations, including individual-
level welfare implications. Next, we discuss the influence of sales taxes and derive the conclusion that
individual-level welfare loss caused by resale market friction costs is invariant to sales tax rates. Lastly,
we connect individual and market-level welfare implications. The primary goal here is constructing a
minimalistic model that enables us to interpret and estimate resale market friction costs for understanding
individual-level welfare loss.
3.1 A Model of Competitive Resale Goods Markets
A new good seller (i.e. Japan Railways) supplies new durable (and partially usable yet indivisible) goods
in a primary market without the restriction of a supply capacity, at least within a relevant range of
supply. The seller is committed to the new goods price P
New
(or P
V,New
) for an exogenous reason, and it
does not engage in resale trade. Used goods buyers and sellers are trading in resale markets. As similar to
most durable goods resale markets (e.g. used iPhone and car sold on eBay), a buyer is able to substitute
between a new good and a used good. For exploiting the nature of our empirically analyzing goods, in
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the rest of this research, we focus on the case of perfectly substitutable new and used goods.13 We assume
the arrival of buyers and sellers are exogenous, and all market participants know the process of such ar-
rivals. We construct a model in which a buyer knows a plan for her durable goods usage (i.e. how many
train rides she will use) in advance and her private-value-based willingness to pay (denoted as V ) before
she purchases a new or used good. Accordingly, we use the notation d for a buyer who has a demand
for four train rides, c for a buyer who has a demand for three, and b and a are defined in the same fashion.14
We define the following three types of secondary market friction costs. The first friction cost is search-
and-bidding cost (Search) for capturing a buyer-side opportunity cost for searching a desired good in an
online resale market, investigating the details (e.g. shipping method after winning), making a bid (or
bids), awaiting a result, and potentially re-participating in other auctions if she fails to obtain a currently
bid-on good. We assume this search-and-bidding cost to be constant over time and across buyers as all
resale good buyers have the same option of substituting to a new good regardless of their demand types
and timings. The second type of resale market friction cost is expected resale transaction cost (Resale)
that captures secondary market seller-side opportunity costs such as preparing photos and textural expla-
nations on an auction website, answering inquiries from potential buyers, awaiting an auction outcome,
shipping an auctioned good to a winner, and potentially having to resubmit a good in the case of an
unsuccessful sale. We use the term “expected” for this friction cost as this is a perceived cost when a
buyer (who will later be a used good seller) makes her purchasing decision, yet the cost is realized later
when she become a seller. The third friction cost is a scrap cost (Scrap) that captures a disposal cost
that a user has to incur when she uses up a durable good.15 We normalize the cost of buying a new good
to be zero.16 Moreover, we use the notation of EPt for an expected resale price at time t, and several
empirical constructions are examined regarding expected resale prices as robustness checks later.
13We will discuss the implications to imperfectly substitutable good markets in the conclusion section.
14This framework could be translated into car buyers in new and used car markets based on intended usage of mileage. For
example, a type e buyer intends to use a car for 200,000 miles, a type d buyer intends 160,000 miles, ...., and so on.
15We include this scrap cost for the generalizablility and economic interpretations of our model. In our empirical analysis, we
set Scrap = 0 (or negligibly small), which is validated as scrap cost simply means the cost of discarding a Seishun 18 paper
ticket into a trash box after using it up. In addition, as we will discuss later, Resale and Scrap cannot be separately identified.
16One can alternatively interpret that the cost of buying a new good (ticket) is included in a willingness to pay (Vd, Vc, Vb, or
Va) as a normalization. This normalization is justified as a ticket buyer (a train traveler) has to go to a train station when she
travels, and a new ticket is sold only at Japan Railways train stations.
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Given these notations, a type d buyer (who has a demand of four train rides) has purchasing options of
UV,Newd = Vd − P
V,New
+ EPIt − ResaleIt (d-V)
U IVd = Vd − P IVt − Search − Scrap. (d-IV)
One could view the above utility specifications as a two-period model in which a buyer purchases a (new
or used) good today and potentially resales the remaining usage later. Equation (d-V) describes the
utility gain from purchasing a new ticket from a primary market (i.e. from Japan Railways) for a buyer
who later will resale the remaining one train ride in the resale market with the sacrifice of the resale
transaction cost. On the other hand, equation (d-IV) illustrates the gains from purchasing a slightly used
vintage-IV ticket in a secondary market with the sacrifice of search-and-bidding cost (and consumes four
train rides) and the scrap cost upon using up. As the new and used goods are perfectly substitutable,
a buyer obtains the same utility Vd in both equations (d-V) and (d-IV). Note that buyers could be
heterogeneous in Vd, yet the heterogeneities in willingness to pay does not affect theoretical results and
empirical estimation methods we explain later. Next, a type c buyer (who has a demand of three train
rides) has options of
UV,Newc = Vc − PV,New + EPIIt − ResaleIIt (c-V)
U IVc = Vc − P IVt − Search + EPIt − ResaleIt (c-IV)
U IIIc = Vc − P IIIt − Search − Scrap. (c-III)
Furthermore, a type b buyer (who has a demand of two train rides) has options of
UV,Newb = Vb − P
V,New
+ EPIIIt − ResaleIIIt (b-V)
U IVb = Vb − P IVt − Search + EPIIt − ResaleIIt (b-IV)
U IIIb = Vb − P IIIt − Search + EPIt − ResaleIt (b-III)
U IIb = Vb − P IIt − Search − Scrap. (b-II)
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Lastly, a type a buyer (who has a demand of one train ride) has options of
UV,Newa = Va − PV,New + EPIVt − ResaleIVt (a-V)
U IVa = Va − P IVt − Search + EPIIIt − ResaleIIIt (a-IV)
U IIIa = Va − P IIIt − Search + EPIIt − ResaleIIt (a-III)
U IIa = Va − P IIt − Search + EPIt − ResaleIt (a-II)
U Ia = Va − P It − Search − Scrap. (a-I)
We now propose the following assumption for the sake of simplifying individual-level welfare analyses
and empirical investigations.
Assumption 1 - Competitive Price-Taking Rational Expectation Equilibrium with no Arbitrage Condi-
tion:
Resale markets are competitive in the sense that market participants are price takers. In addition, they
form rational expectations, and their expectations on resale prices agree with observed prices. Further-
more, there is no arbitrage (no free lunch) opportunity, and a buyer gets the same utility regardless of
her new- or used-good purchasing choice.
The above price-taking assumption fits with to resale markets in which numerous buyers and sellers are
participating and price information is publicly known, as there is little chance to exploit arbitrage op-
portunities in such resale markets through asymmetric information and market power.17 In our empirical
application, we investigate the auction markets for resale goods in which numerous buyers and sellers
make transactions for the same goods within a day, and transaction prices are publicly displayed. In such
large-size resale good markets, it is not likely that a single participant has a significant market power
to change the price. Furthermore, Yahoo! Auction employs an eBay-like proxy-bid format in which a
winner of auction pays a second-highest proxy bid. In other words, conditional on winning, the winner’s
own bid does not change a market price. One indifference-condition is based on type d buyer’s utility
functions; three are based on type c; six are based on type b; and ten are based on type a. The exact
form of such an indifference condition system is written as
17The modeling framework of a competitive resale market is also used in Esteban and Shum (2007) and Chen et al. (2013).
Furthermore, regarding our empirically analyzing resale markets, anecdotal evidence left on internet forums shows that arbitrage
opportunities were immediately exploited by market participants.
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−P IVt −EPIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleI + Scrap (d-IV) = (d-V)
−P IVt −EPIIt + EPIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleII +ResaleI (c-IV) = (c-V)
−P IIIt −EPIIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleII + Scrap (c-III) = (c-V)
P IVt −P IIIt −EPIt = −ResaleI + Scrap (c-III) = (c-IV)
−P IVt −EPIIIt + EPIIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleIII +ResaleII (b-IV) = (b-V)
−P IIIt −EPIIIt + EPIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleIII +ResaleI (b-III) = (b-V)
−P IIt −EPIIIt = −PV,New +Search −ResaleIII + Scrap (b-II) = (b-V)
P IVt −P IIIt −EPIIt + EPIt = −ResaleII +ResaleI (b-III) = (b-IV)
P IVt −P IIt −EPIIt = −ResaleII + Scrap (b-II) = (b-IV)
P IIIt −P IIt −EPIt = −ResaleI + Scrap (b-II) = (b-III)
−P IVt −EPIVt + EPIIIt = −PV,New +Search−ResaleIV +ResaleIII (a-IV) = (a-V)
−P IIIt −EPIVt + EPIIt = −PV,New +Search−ResaleIV +ResaleII (a-III) = (a-V)
−P IIt −EPIVt + EPIt = −PV,New +Search−ResaleIV +ResaleI (a-II) = (a-V)
−P It −EPIVt = −PV,New +Search−ResaleIV + Scrap (a-I) = (a-V)
P IVt −P IIIt −EPIIIt + EPIIt = −ResaleIII +ResaleII (a-III) = (a-IV)
P IVt −P IIt −EPIIIt + EPIt = −ResaleIII +ResaleI (a-II) = (a-IV)
P IVt −P It −EPIIIt = −ResaleIII + Scrap (a-I) = (a-IV)
P IIIt −P IIt −EPIIt + EPIt = −ResaleII +ResaleI (a-II) = (a-III)
P IIIt −P It −EPIIt = −ResaleII + Scrap (a-I) = (a-III)
P IIt −P It −EPIt = −ResaleI +Scrap. (a-I) = (a-II)
Note that valuation terms (Vd, Vc, Vb, and Va) are canceled out as we are analyzing perfectly substitutable
goods.18
3.2 Observations and Individual-Level Welfare Implications
The indifference condition system provides the following insightful observations. We first restrict our
attention to the case of stationary equilibrium (i.e. P kt = EPkt for k ∈ {I, II, III, IV}, the price you see
today will be the same one you will see upon your resale transaction) with which the indifference condition
system has a unique solution. Stationary equilibrium indicates a direction of price distortions caused by
each of the three resale-market friction costs. Then, we investigate the case of non-stationary equilibria in
which a current price could be different from an expected price (i.e P kt could differ from EPkt ) for discussing
individual-level welfare implications. For the simplicity of notations, we here omit the time subscript t.
Furthermore, we slightly abuse the ticket-vintage index in the way of k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} = {I, II, III, IV,V}
for simplifying mathematical notations. The linear-algebra-based proofs of the following observations are
found in Appendix. Note that in our analyses, the new good (fixed) price and resale market friction costs
are exogenous, while resale market prices are endogenously determined.
Observation 2 - Stationary Equilibrium (P k = EPk) - Theoretical Frictionless Resale Prices:
18The left hand side of the system equations are endogenous variables, while the right hand side parameters are exogenous.
Under the stationary (P k = EPk) assumption, the rank and unknown variables in the left hand side matrix are both four,
indicating a unique solution. On the other hand, under the non-stationary (P k could differ from EPk) assumption, the rank of
left hand side matrix is seven with eight unknown variables, indicating a general solution has one undetermined parameter. See
Observation 4 for such a general solution.
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If resale market friction costs are all zero (i.e. Search = ResaleIV = ResaleIII = ResaleII = ResaleI =
Scrap = 0), there is a unique solution of the indifference condition system, P k = EPk = k5P
V,New
for
k ∈ {I, II, III, IV}.
Observation 2 provides us with the basis of individual-level welfare loss analyses. In our empirical
investigation, the listed price is P
V,New
= $115 (= e95 = £75). Consequently, we denote theoretical
frictionless prices of each type of ticket as P IV,Theo = $92 (= e76 = £60), P III,Theo = $69 (= e57 = £45),
P II,Theo = $46 (= e38 = £30), and P I,Theo = $23 (= e19 = £15).
Next, we investigate resale market price distortions caused by friction costs. The following observation
summarizes the implications of resale price distortions in a stationary equilibrium.
Observation 3 - Unique Stationary Equilibrium (P k = EPk) - Mixed Directions of Resale Price Dis-
tortions:
If Search > 0, Resale = ResaleIV = ResaleIII = ResaleII = ResaleI > 0, and Scrap > 0, there is a
unique solution of the indifference condition system,
P k = EPk =
k
5
(P
V,New − Search) + 5− k
5
Resale− 5− k
5
Scrap,
for k ∈ {I, II, III, IV}.
Observation 3 indicates that, even in a unique stationary equilibrium, the directions of price distortions
depend on the size of friction costs. Thus, an empirical estimation is required for understanding the causes
of such price distortions and investigating welfare implications. The comparisons between theoretical
prices (based on Observation 2) and distorted resale prices (based on Observation 3) are summarized in
Table 1. In Table 1, the row of a vintage V (brand new) ticket that has the exogenous and fixed price
of P
V,New
is supplementarily added for a comparison purpose. Notably and interestingly, in Table 1,
there is a discontinuity in coefficients of search-and-bidding cost (Search) between vintage V (brand new
good) and IV (slightly used good).
Now we move to a class of non-stationary (i.e. P k could differ from EPk) equilibria.
Observation 4 - Non-Stationary Equilibrium (P k could differ from EPk) - General Solutions:
If Search > 0, Resale = ResaleIV = ResaleIII = ResaleII = ResaleI > 0, and Scrap > 0, solutions of
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Table 1: Resale Price Distortions in Stationary Equilibrium (P k = EPk)
Vintage category Price in Frictionless Price in Frictional Markets Price Distortion Caused by
Resale Markets (Search > 0, Resale > 0, and Scrap > 0) Resale Market Frictions
V: valid for five rides (brand new good) 5
5
PV,New 5
5
P
V,New − 0
5
Search + 0
5
Resale− 0
5
Scrap − 0
5
Search + 0
5
Resale− 0
5
Scrap
IV: ...... four rides (slightly used good) 4
5
PV,New 4
5
P
V,New − 4
5
Search + 1
5
Resale− 1
5
Scrap − 4
5
Search + 1
5
Resale− 1
5
Scrap
III: ...... three rides (moderately used good) 3
5
PV,New 3
5
P
V,New − 3
5
Search + 2
5
Resale− 2
5
Scrap − 3
5
Search + 2
5
Resale− 2
5
Scrap
II: ...... two rides (slightly heavily used good) 2
5
PV,New 2
5
P
V,New − 2
5
Search + 3
5
Resale− 3
5
Scrap − 2
5
Search + 3
5
Resale− 3
5
Scrap
I: ...... one ride (heavily used good) 1
5
PV,New 1
5
P
V,New − 1
5
Search + 4
5
Resale− 4
5
Scrap − 1
5
Search + 4
5
Resale− 4
5
Scrap
The row of a vintage V ticket, which has the exogenous and fixed price of P
V,New
, is added for comparison.
There is a discontinuity in coefficients of search-and-bidding cost (Search) between vintage V (brand new good) and IV (slightly used good).
the indifference condition system can be written as,

P IV
P III
P II
P I
EPIV
EPIII
EPII
EPI

=

4/5
3/5
2/5
1/5
4/5
3/5
2/5
1/5

(P
V,New − Search) +

1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5
1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5

Resale+

−1/5
−2/5
−3/5
−4/5
−1/5
−2/5
−3/5
−4/5

Scrap+

1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5
−4/5
−3/5
−2/5
−1/5

s, (1)
where s ∈ R is a scalar parameter.
The above observation indicates infinite number of equilibrium solutions, as a solution with an arbitrary
parameter s ∈ R satisfies the indifference condition system. Note that if s 6= 0, the system solutions are
non-stationary (and asymmetric) in the sense that P k 6= EPk for k ∈ {I, II, III, IV}. In equation (1),
the last term (the term that contains an arbitrary parameter s) has the positive vector elements for P kt s
and the negative ones for EPkt s, indicating the possibility of a bubbling (i.e. P k < EPk with s < 0) or a
busting (P k > EPk with s > 0) equilibrium.19
Next, by assigning the equilibrium prices in Observation 4 to the utility functions [(d-V) to (a-I)],
we can derive the individual buyer level utility losses caused by resale market friction costs. By coun-
terfactually positing that the resale market with and without friction costs share the same parameter
19In the case of non-stationary equilibrium, the other conditions, such as P IV < P
V,New
, EPIV < PV,New, P I > 0, and EPI > 0
(i.e. resale prices are between zero and a new good price), have to be satisfied.
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Table 2: Utility Loss in Non-Stationary (P k may not be equal to EPk) Equilibria
User Type Utility in Frictionless Utility in Frictional Markets Utility Loss Caused by
Resale Markets (Search > 0, Resale > 0, and Scrap > 0) Resale Market Frictions
e: demanding five train rides Ve − 55PV,New − 05 s Ve − 55PV,New − 05Search− 05Resale− 55Scrap− 05 s − 05Search− 05Resale− 55Scrap
d: ...... four ...... Vd − 45PV,New − 15 s Vd − 45PV,New − 15Search− 15Resale− 45Scrap− 15 s − 15Search− 15Resale− 45Scrap
c: ...... three ...... Vc − 35PV,New − 25 s Vc − 35PV,New − 25Search− 25Resale− 35Scrap− 25 s − 25Search− 25Resale− 35Scrap
b: ...... two ...... Vb − 25PV,New − 35 s Vb − 25PV,New − 35Search− 35Resale− 25Scrap− 35 s − 35Search− 35Resale− 25Scrap
a: ...... one ...... Va − 15PV,New − 45 s Va − 15PV,New − 45Search− 45Resale− 15Scrap− 45 s − 45Search− 45Resale− 15Scrap
The row of type e buyer who has a demand of five train rides is added for comparison.
value of s, we get the following proposition that will be the basis of our welfare analyses.20 Note that the
proposition below holds for any values of s.
Proposition 5 - Non-Stationary Equilibria (P k could differ from EPk) - Individual-Level Welfare Loss:
The individual level utility loss caused by the resale market friction costs to a durable goods buyer who
demands the degree of D usage (train rides) is
WelfareLoss(D) = − 5−D
5︸ ︷︷ ︸
reversely-proportional
Search − 5−D
5︸ ︷︷ ︸
reversely-proportional
Resale − D
5︸︷︷︸
proportional
Scrap, (2)
where D ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} is a demanded durable good usage index.
Table 2 summarizes the findings of welfare distortions created by the resale market friction costs. The
second column reports utilities achieved with hypothetical frictionless resale market prices, while the
third column addresses utilities attained with frictional resale market prices. The last column states
the gaps between unitilies obtained from frictionless and frictional resale markets. In addition, Figure
5, under the assumption of no search cost (Seach = 0), visually illustrates the individual-level welfare
losses categorized by the intended degree of usage. The height dimension is an individual-level welfare
loss (WelfareLoss(D)), the width dimension is a search cost (Search), and the depth dimension is a
resale cost (Resale). There are three immediate individual-level welfare implications in this proposition.
First, welfare loss is heterogeneous across buyers who demand a different degree of durable good usage.
Furthermore, the degree of heterogeneities increases as search and resale costs become large, as depicted
in Figure 5. Second, the coefficients of a search cost (Search) and a resale cost (Resale) are reversely-
20This counterfactual argument is legitimate since it is pragmatically not feasible to obtain data of frictionless resale markets
(that do not exist in a real world setting) and estimate the parameter s of such fictionless marekts.
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proportional to the intended usage. This means the utility loss caused by an additional increase in search
or resale costs is relatively large among buyers who demand a smaller degree of usage. Third, contrary
to the second finding, the coefficient of a scrap cost (Scrap) is proportional to the usage.
Proposition 5 distills the fundamental role of competitive resale markets; competitive resale good markets
proportionally or reverse-proportionally split negative externalities caused in resale transactions, based
on buyers’ intended degrees of durable goods usage. Note that any resale market transaction intrinsically
creates negative externalities. If Alice wants to resell her durable good, that means she is implicitly
asking a buyer in a durable good market to sacrifice a search cost to find Alice’s good. Oppositely, if
Ben wants buy a used good, he is essentially requesting a seller in a resale market to endure a resale
cost to transfer a good to Ben. Furthermore, if Chris attempts to sell his currently own good rather
than scrapping it, he is fundamentally appealing to a next (or subsequent) owner to forgo a scrap cost.
Durable good resale markets, in a nutshell, are tools to transfer and split such durable goods related
negative externalities.21
3.3 Effect of Sales Taxes
Next, we investigate the effect of sales taxes. We here analyze the three taxes that are proportionally
charged on transacted prices: a buyer-side sales tax on a new good with the rate of τNewB , a buyer-side
sales tax on a resale good with the rate of τB, and a seller-side sales tax on a resale good with the rate
of τS .
22 Note that if a market organizer (e.g. eBay, Yahoo! Auction, etc.) charges a seller a fee that is
proportional to a transacted price, one can include such a proportional fee in τS . Accordingly, utility
functions can be modified with these taxes. For example, type d buyer’s utility functions become
UV,Newd = Vd − (1 + τNewB )P
V,New
+ (1− τS)EPI − Resale (d-V)′
U IVd = Vd − (1 + τB)P IV − Search − Scrap. (d-IV)′
21Note that proportional or reversely proportional coefficients in (2) could be interpreted in a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism fashion.
22Note that some countries, including Japan, apply a value-added-based taxation system of τNewB > 0 and τB = 0 since a
treasury of such a country legislatively interpret that a used good transaction in a resale market does not add a value to a good.
In other words, they hold that resale goods do not add value and, thus, not taxable.
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As described in the above utility functions, the existence of sales taxes does not change the structure and
rank of indifference condition system,23 and the solutions of indifference condition system equations are
characterized as

P IV
P III
P II
P I
EPIV
EPIII
EPII
EPI

=

(1 + τB)
−1
(1 + τB)
−1
(1 + τB)
−1
(1 + τB)
−1
(1− τS)−1
(1− τS)−1
(1− τS)−1
(1− τS)−1

.×


4/5
3/5
2/5
1/5
4/5
3/5
2/5
1/5

(
(1 + τNewB )P
V,New − Search
)
+

1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5
1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5

Resale+

−1/5
−2/5
−3/5
−4/5
−1/5
−2/5
−3/5
−4/5

Scrap+

1/5
2/5
3/5
4/5
−4/5
−3/5
−2/5
−1/5

s

, (3)
where s ∈ R is a scalar parameter and .× is an element-by-element multiplication operator. Then, by
substituting these equilibrium prices, we get the following observation.
Observation 6 - Non-Stationary Equilibria ((1+τB)P
k could differ from (1−τS)EPk) - Sales Tax Rate
Invariance:
The individual-level welfare loss caused by resale-market friction costs are invariant to buyer- and seller-
side sales tax rates.
Note that, with these sales taxes, the contents of Table 2 that describe individual-level utilities remain
the same, except the minor change that P
V,New
is replace by (1 + τNewB )P
V,New
.
3.4 Heterogeneous Welfare Effects of Resale Market Friction Costs
The findings in individual-level welfare loss can be easily connected to the market-level welfare analysis as
depicted in Figures 6 to 9. In each of these figures, the demand of type e buyer (who demands five train
rides) is drawn at the left-most position, that of type d (who demands four train rides) is second from
the left, and other types of buyers’ demands are illustrated in the same way. Note that these figures are
for describing welfare of durable good buyers and not for describing markets for each vintages of durable
goods. For this reason, the horizontal axises are for describing the demanded quantities of each type of
buyers, and we use the notation of Qe, Qd, Qc, Qb, and Qa for conceptually representing them. Figure
6 illustrates the welfare gain if resale opportunities were prohibited.24 Figure 7 describes the welfare
23Precisely describing, if we redefine after-tax new good prices as ρV,New = (1 + τNewB )P
V,New
, resale market prices as ρk =
(1+τB)P
k, and expected resale market prices as Eρk = (1−τS)EPk, the mathematical structure of indifference condition system
equations preserves.
24Prohibition of resale opportunities is not unrealistic as in the cases of airline, some sports events (e.g. Olympic games), and
music concert tickets. For example, in the U.K., it is a legal offense to resale football/soccer match tickets under the Parliament
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that could be generated when resale opportunities are allowed in frictionless (i.e. no resale related costs)
resale markets. As described in Observation 2, the resale prices are proportional to the remaining usage
of durable goods, and a welfare gain is generated though the legalization of resale markets. However,
as characterized in Proposition 5, the existence of resale market friction costs dwarfs such welfare gain,
as represented in Figure 8. The structure of welfare loss is two-fold. The first and direct loss is caused
by disutility resulting from resale market friction costs in a buyer’s utility function. The second loss is
caused by the changes in resale market prices that also appear in utility functions. Note that this second
loss could be positive or negative as described by the mixed price distortions directions in Observation 3.
Lastly, the dead-weight loss is illustrated in Figure 9, and the height of loss within each type of demand
is characterized in Proposition 5.25
Act in 1994.
25A numerical evaluation of dead-weight loss caused by resale market friction costs requires entire-market-level transaction
data, and it is beyond the scope of this research. We leave such an assessment as an open agenda for future researchers who are
able to obtain detailed transaction data from both primary and secondary markets. It should be credited that, in the case of
limited supply in a primary market, Leslie and Sorensen (2014) (who analyze rock concert ticket markets) assess the dead-weight
loss through counterfactual simulations.
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Figure 5: Individual-Level Welfare Losses (with Scrap = 0)
(a) Type e User (Who has the demand of
five rides) - No Welfare Loss
(b) Type d User (Who has the demand of
four rides)
(c) Type c User (Who has the demand of
three rides)
(d) Type b User (Who has the demand of
two rides)
(e) Type a User (Who has the demand of
one ride)
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4 Estimation Methods and Results
This section first explains the three types of expected price constructions that will be used for the
GMM estimations. Then, we report the GMM estimation results based on the closed-form resale market
price solution equations of (3). We also calculate Heteroskedasticity Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC)
standard errors and report the results of over-identification tests.
4.1 Empirical Constructions of Expected Resale Prices
The construction of the expected resale prices at time t, denoted as EPkt where k ∈ {I, II, III, IV} is a
used ticket vintage index, plays a crucial role in our empirical investigations. Here, for the robustness
checks, we investigate the three different constructions of expected resale prices: (1) averaged subsequent
transaction price, (2) present-price-biased stationary price, and (3) ten-day-later later price construction
methods.
(1) Averaged Subsequent Transaction Price Construction:
The next construction uses the auction market transaction-level data for calculating the expected resale
prices. We here denote nkt as a number of transacted sales of vintage k tickets at time t. Then, we
calculate an expected resale price in the following simple fashion of
EPkt =
1
Nkt,After
T∑
a=t+1
nka∑
j=1
pa,j , (4)
where Nkt,After =
∑T
a=t+1 n
k
a is a number of observed transacted sales of vintage k tickets recorded after
time t, a ∈ {t + 1, · · · , T} is an index for periods after the period t, pa,j is a recorded transacted price,
and j ∈ {1, · · · , nka} is a transaction index. Intuitively, this definition of expected price assumes that a
bidder who buys a ticket today with the intention of reselling (the unused proportion of the ticket) later
has a likelihood to resale based on the empirically observed resale transaction frequency in the online
auction market. In other words, a buyer (who buys a resalable ticket today) stochastically chooses her
timing of the resale day with the probability that agrees with empirically observed subsequent resale
good transaction frequency.
(2) Stationary (Present-Price-Biased) Price Construction:
24
The natural starting point of examination is
EPkt = P kt , (5)
as suggested by the Observations 2 to 3. This construction empirically assumes that buyers in our em-
pirically analyzing market believe that, after a train ride (or train rides) they will be able to resale the
used ticket at a currently (on a purchasing date) observed price.
(3) One-Week-Later Ad Hoc Price Construction:
The last construction assumes that a reseller returns to a market in approximately one week after she
purchased it.
EPkt = PKt+7,Moving Average, (6)
Although this construction is ad hock in terms of the resale date, it has the advantage of capturing the
traveling periods after the purchase date.
4.2 Estimation Method and Results
Given the above constructions of expected prices, we here apply the two-step GMM estimation method.
As observed prices within each ticket vintage are time series data, serial correlations are naturally ex-
pected to emerge. For this reason, we apply the Heteroskedasticity Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC)
method for calculating weight matrices and standard errors. Specifically, we apply the Bartlett Kernel
for computing covariance matrices. Note that this GMM estimation has eight moments (of closed form
solutions of resale market prices) and three estimating parameters (Search, Resale, and s). Thus, over-
identification and model validity test can be examined.
The estimation results are listed in Table 3 (excluding the term of Scrap, which set to be zero in
our empirical investigation). We estimated resale market friction costs (Search and Resale) and market
condition (s) parameters under the three types of expected price constructions discussed previously. It
turns out that the estimates of Search are stable across different constructions, while Resale and s both
change under the different specifications. Especially, the stationary (present-price-biased) model provides
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Table 3: Estimation Results? (2013, Summer)
(1) (2) (3)
Resale market Averaged-subsequent Stationary One-week-later
parameter transaction (present-price-biased) ad hoc
price construction price construction price construction
Search† $6.752*** $6.374*** $6.622***
(0.296) (0.689) (0.352)
Resale‡ $10.03*** $14.88*** $12.83***
(0.021) (0.581) (0.210)
s 8.745*** N.A. 5.853***
(0.195) (N.A.) (0.235)
Number of periods 33 33 33
J-statistic 4.659 4.487 4.561
(p-value) (0.459) (0.482) (0.472)
?: Inside of brackets are HAC standard errors, **** indicates the significance with 1%
†: Used good buyer-side search-and-bidding cost
‡: Used good seller-side reselling cost
Note: Scrap cost (Scrap) fixed at zero.
the highest resale cost and lowest market condition parameter.
In Table 3, all parameters have significance at 1% level. Additionally, calculated p-values indicate that
the model moments conditions are not rejected. Thus, our structual motel is not rejected by the observed
data. Furthermore, all estimated cost parameters are reasonably large (ranging from approximately $6
to $14), indicating the importance of empirically investigating resale market friction costs. Given these
empirical findings, we now proceed to the welfare loss analyses.
5 Individual-Level Welfare Loss Implications
In this section, we discuss individual-level welfare loss analyses caused by the resale market friction
costs. The effects are largely heterogeneous and described as disadvantages for durable goods users who
purchase them with the intention of a relatively short degree of usage.
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Table 4: Individual-Level Welfare Loss: with Ŝearch > 0, R̂esale > 0, and Scrap = 0, Summer 2013
User Type
(1) (2) (3)
Averaged-subsequent Stationary One-week-later
transaction (present-price-biased) ad hoc
price construction price construction price construction
e: demanding five train rides -$ 0.000 (- 0.0%) -$ 0.000 (- 0.0%) -$ 0.000 (- 0.0%)
d: ...... four ...... -$ 3.356 (- 2.9%) -$ 4.251 (- 3.7%) -$ 3.890 (- 3.4%)
c: ...... three ...... -$ 6.713 (- 5.8%) -$ 8.502 (- 7.4%) -$ 7.781 (- 6.8%)
b: ...... two ...... -$10.069 (- 8.8%) -$12.752 (-11.1%) -$11.671 (-10.1%)
a: ...... one ...... -$13.426 (-11.7%) -$17.003 (-14.8%) -$15.562 (-13.5%)
Inside of parentheses are percentages of the new goods price ($115).
The row of type e buyer who has a demand of five train rides is added for comparison.
5.1 Empirical Individual-Level Welfare Loss: Heterogeneous Effects
Based on the estimation results reported in Table 3, the heterogeneous and individual-user-level welfare-
loss effects are calculated based on equation (2) with estimated search and resale cost parameters under
three different constructions of expected resale prices, listed as (1), (2), and (3) in Table 4. For our
empirical analyses, that we assume Scrap = 0. Note that individual-level welfare deteriorates thorough
two channels. The first channel is resale-market friction costs (Search and Resale) that directly appear
in the utility functions. The second channel is resale market prices. Under the competitive resale market
condition, resale market prices (that users have to accept) are affected by resale market friction costs, as
expressed by the closed form solution in equation (1) (or equation (3)).
There are two major findings in Table 4. First, if durable goods users do not intend to use up goods, the
size of welfare-loss is non-negligibly large. The only user type who is free from welfare loss is a type e
user (who has the demand of five rides) and who intends to use up the train rides. Second, although the
degree of welfare losses slightly vary across different expected resale price constructions (i.e. across (1)
to (3)), we empirically find that they significantly differ across user types (i.e across user type e to a).
For example, under the construction of (1), individual-level welfare losses differ from -2.9% (for a type d
user who intends to use four times) to -11.7% (for a type a user who intends to use only one time) of the
new good price.
Descriptively speaking, these individual-level welfare losses could be considered as “hidden charges”
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levied on the resale market participants, and some potential durable goods users are excluded from the
markets as their willingness-to-pays are not large enough to justify these hidden changes. Lastly, as
Search → 0 and Resale → 0 (and in our general model, Scrap → 0), these individual-level welfare
losses converge to zero, enabling frictionless resale markets without any welfare loss and enabling more
potential users (who have relatively low willingness-to-pays) to purchase durable goods.
6 Conclusion
By proposing the structural model of competitive resale markets with no arbitrage conditions and by
using the unique dataset of perfectly substitutable durable goods, this research empirically assesses the
individual-level welfare losses caused by resale market friction costs. Traditionally, resale market friction
costs are not included in empirical durable goods market investigations due to model tractability con-
cerns, yet our estimation results newly show that such individual-level welfare losses are non-negligibly
large and largely heterogeneous across users with differing degrees of intended durable goods usage. Such
individual-level welfare losses could be considered as “hidden charges” on participants of durable goods
resale markets. Such hidden charges make some buyers excluded from both new and used goods markets.
As the markets of quickly-circulating durable goods are rapidly growing and expanding in scope, these
new findings will be the basis of further investigations of a broader categorization of online-traded durable
goods.
Lastly, the scope of external validities and limitations of these results should be clearly mentioned. The
goods investigated in this research differ from general durable goods (mobile phones, electric devices,
cars, houses, etc.) in at least two dimensions: imperfect substitutability and perfect planning on durable
goods usage. First, if durable goods are imperfectly substitutable, a buyer has less utility (or disutility)
when she fails to obtain her most desired good. In this case, such disutility is considered as another
friction cost, and it straight-forwardly transmits through competitive resale market prices. As a result,
imperfect substitutability negatively contributes to an individual-level welfare loss.26 Thus, an individual-
level welfare loss in imperfectly-substitutable durable good markets is expected to be larger than the one
with perfectly-substitutable markets expressed in Equation (2). Second, if there are imperfectly-planning
durable good users, the individual-level welfare analyses have unclear implications. Note that our em-
26Provide a simple example of this disutility and further welfare loss in Appendix.
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pirical analyses can reasonably assume a train traveler knows her intended usage as they have to decide
their travel plans in advance (to coordinate with their other travel arrangements, such as hotel bookings
and schedule coordination with other people). In addition, this assumption of perfectly-planning durable
good users agrees with the recent trend of resale-aimed purchases with planned temporary ownership,
described in the introduction. However, in many durable goods markets, users have vague plans for the
timing of their reselling. The inclusion of such imperfectly-planning users inevitably requires dynamic
programmings and is computationally challenging. Yet, given the importance of durable goods mar-
kets and associated welfare implications in the real world, empirical and structural investigations with
imperfectly-planning users are an essential direction of future research.
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